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This study examines whether Piotroski’s (2000) F-Score strategy can successfully be 
applied to the Chinese A-Share market. The empirical evidence shows that in the 
Chinese A-Share market, the high F-Score portfolio significantly outperforms the low 
F-Score portfolio. Especially within a low BM firm sample, buying high F-Score firms 
and shorting low F-Score firms consistently, on average, generate 1.28% market 
adjusted profit per month. The results are robust for size partition. However, the benefits 
of Piotroski’s F-Score strategy are concentrated in low liquidity and analyst following 
sample. Within the high BM firm sample, Piotroski’s F-Score strategy cannot generate 
any significant return. The excess return of a low BM sample persists across time, as 
well as after controlling for size, book-to-market ratio, and market beta. In addition, if 
we measure risk in terms of beta and volatility, high F-Score firms are less risky than 
low F-Score firms. To conclude, the empirical evidence presented in this study suggests 
investors can use Piotroski’s F-Score to identify mispriced stocks and earn abnormal 
returns in the Chinese A-share market, especially within a low BM firm sample.  
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The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) developed by Eugene Fama (Fama 1970) has 
enjoyed wide academic support over the last few decades. According to the EMH, if 
the market is semi-strong form efficient, then no trading strategy based on historical 
and currently available information can earn excess risk-adjusted returns. In other 
words, all value-relevant accounting information is already fully incorporated into the 
stock when the financial statements are released. Therefore, analyzing financial 
statements should not offer any value. However, anomalies such as post-earnings-
announcement drift (PEAD) challenge the EMH. PEAD is the tendency for a stock’s 
cumulative abnormal returns to drift in the direction of an earnings surprise following 
an earnings announcement. This process may last for several days up to several months. 
The existence of the PEAD anomaly indicates that stocks might not always trade at 
their true fundamental value. Consequently, this provides an opportunity for investors 
to develop investment strategies that exploit inefficiencies of the market. 
 One well-studied strategy is fundamental investing. Fundamental investors rely on 
financial statement information to predict the intrinsic value of a stock, they buy(sell) 
stocks which are trading at prices substantially lower(higher) than their intrinsic value.  
Ou and Penman,1989 and Holthausen and Larcker, 1992 collectively show the ability 
of financial ratios derived from historical financial statements to predict future earnings 
changes and stock returns. Abarbanell and Bushee(1998) show that a fundamental 
strategy based on simple financial ratios can generate superior returns for investors.  
 Another well-known strategy is value investing. Value investors try to buy stocks 
that are undervalued. Valuation multiples such as the book-to-market (BM) value, is 
often used to determine whether a stock is a value stock or a growth stock. Stocks with 
high BM ratios are considered value stocks, while those with low ratios are classified 
as growth stocks. Evidence that value stocks outperform growth stocks (value/glamour 
effect) can be traced back to Basu (1977), who shows value stocks on average earn 
higher absolute and risk-adjusted rates of return than growth stocks. Basu’s finding 
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indicate that publicly available financial information is not fully reflected in stock price 
as fast as is stated in the EMH, and there seem to be lags and frictions in the adjustment 
process. However, Basu did not study what causes the value/glamour effect. Fama and 
French (1992) and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) are pioneer researchers who 
attempt to explain the value/glamour effect. Fama and French argue value stocks are 
riskier, therefore higher returns are appropriate compensation for increased risk. 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, on the other hand, argue the value/glamour effect is 
a result of cognitive biases underlying investor behaviour.  
 Combining fundamental analysis with value investing, Piotroski (2000) developed 
a score based strategy (F-Score strategy) to identify high quality (high score) firms and 
low quality (low score) firms within a high (BM) sample. Piotroski shows that the 
average annualised market-adjusted returns to buying high score firms are 7.5% higher 
than simply buying the generic high BM portfolio. In addition, a long/short strategy 
based on his F_Score strategy yielded 23% annual return between 1976 and 1996. 
Furthermore, he shows that high scoring firms are fundamentally less risky than low 
scoring firms. Thus, he claims his strategy can improve returns without increasing risk.  
Piotroski’s impressive result sparked the interest of academics around the world. 
Many studies attempt to replicate Piotroski’s strategy outside the U.S. but only a few 
could confirm his original findings (e.g. Rathjens and Schellhove, 2011, Tantipanichkul, 
2011, Hyde, 2013). Studies such as those of Woodley, Jones and Reburn (2011), 
Attwood (2012), and Van der Merwe (2012), find that the F-Score strategy generates 
profit but that this is not statistically significant. 
This study seeks to provide out-of-sample evidence on the effectiveness of the F-
Score strategy. The Chinese A-Share market is interesting to study because it has a high 
percentage of retail investors and low foreign participation, compared to other countries. 
Retail investors account for 90% of the market’s total trading volume (Cheung, Hoguet 
and Ng, 2014). Retail investors in general are less financially sophisticated then 
institutional investors. With little knowledge and limited experience in stock 
investments, most retail investors select stocks based on current rumors about 
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companies. Thus, stock prices are often pushed too high, and then quickly corrected 
(Kang, Liu and Ni,2002). Therefore, it would be interesting to see whether Piotroski’s 
F-Score strategy can identify mispriced stocks in China. 
A major drawback of Piotroski’s study is the choice of accumulation method. 
Piotroski (2000) selects a return accumulation period based on firm-specific financial 
year-ends, rather than establishing a common investment period for all firms. 
Piotroski’s approach is common practice in accounting-based studies of anomalies. 
However, this is problematic in practice, because the weights of the hedged portfolio 
are unknown at the beginning of the accumulation period (Kim and Lee, 2014). 
This paper attempts to address the limitations of the approach by Piotroski (2000). 
To build a tradable portfolio, all stocks need to have the same investment period. 
Therefore, it is necessary to make modifications to Piotroski's original strategy. In 
addition, we calculate returns as a monthly frequency instead of a yearly frequency, and 
use trailing 12-month data instead of year-end data to compute the F-Score.    
We find that the F-Score strategy is effective at separating winners and losers in 
the Chinese A-Share market, especially within the low BM firm sample. On average, 
high F-Score firms outperform low F-Score firms by 1.28% per month. In addition, the 
excess return persists across time, as well as after controlling for known risk factors. 
Contrary to Piotroski's finding, the F-Score strategy does not work for the high BM 
firm sample. In addition, if we measure risk in terms of beta and volatility, high F-Score 
firms are less risky than low F-Score firms.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The next section reviews the 
prior literature on the topic. Section 3 presents the data and research methodology. In 
sections 4 and 5 we present the results and discuss key findings. Section 6 examines the 
robustness of the F-score across time. In section 7 we test whether observed returns are 
abnormal. Section 8 discusses the risk characteristic of Piotroski's F-Score strategy. 





2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Book-to-Market Effect 
 
The BM ratio is a financial ratio that is often used to determine whether a stock is 
undervalued or overvalued. It is calculated by taking the book value of a firm and 
dividing it by the firm’s market value. The BM ratio is also commonly used in studies 
for categorizing whether a stock is a value stock or a growth stock. High BM stocks are 
often referred to as value stocks, which have generally displayed poor past performance. 
Low BM stocks are often referred to as growth stocks, and are those that have 
experience strong earnings growth in the past. 
 The structural outperformance of high BM stocks over low BM stocks is known as 
the Book-to-Market effect. A number of studies have shown that in the U.S, on average, 
high BM stocks outperform low BM stocks(Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein 1985, Fama 
and French 1992, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 1994). Similar results are also found 
in other countries, for example, China (Xiao and Xu ,2004), Japan (Chan, Hamao and 
Lakonishok, 1991), Hong Kong, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand (Chen and Zhang, 1998), 
France, Netherlands, Germany and U.K (Van der Put and Veld, 1996). Although the 
existence of the BM effect is widely accepted, there are two different explanations for 
its underlying cause., the risk-based view, and mispricing.  
The risk-based view argues that the market is efficient. Different stocks are exposed 
to different amount of risk and, therefore, different expected returns. Fama and French 
(1992) find that size and BM ratio, not beta, explain most of the cross section of the 
expected stock returns. They rank stocks by their BM ratios, and classified the highest 
ranked portfolio as a “value” portfolio and the lowest ranked portfolio as a growth 
portfolio. They show that the value portfolio generated an average monthly return of 
1.83%, while the return from the growth portfolio was only 0.30%. However, the betas 
of value and the growth portfolio are similar. Systematic risk is therefore not the 
explanation for the differences in returns. Fama and French (1992,1996) argue that the 
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BM ratio represents the financial distress risk, and that high BM firms are more prone 
to financial distress. Fama and French (1996) uses the multifactor, asset-pricing model 
of Merton (1973) to explain the relationship between financial distress factors and 
returns. Chen and Zhang (1998) examine the BM effect in several pacific rim countries. 
They find that value stocks (stocks with high BM ratios, low price-to-earnings ratios, 
or high dividend yield), in general, are riskier than growth stocks (stocks with low BM 
ratios, high Price-to-earnings, or low dividend yield). This is because value stocks are 
more likely to have poor past earnings, high future earnings volatility, high financial 
leverage, and a high probability of having a dividend cut. Vassalou and Xing (2004) 
find that BM ratio can be used as a proxy to assess a firm's default risk within a small 
firm sample. In a small firm sample, the BM effect is driven by default risk, i.e., small, 
high BM stocks earn excess return because they are more likely to default. Therefore, 
the corresponding higher returns for high BM stocks are compensation for increased 
risk 
The alternative view, which led by studies by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
(1994) argues that cognitive biases underlying investor behavior is the cause of the BM 
effect, not risk. If the high BM stocks are fundamentally risky, then they should 
underperform relative to low BM stocks during economic recessions, when the 
marginal utility of wealth is high. Using historical economic and market return data, 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny divide their sample periods into “good” and “bad” 
states. They show that high BM stocks outperform low BM stocks in all states. They 
conclude that the superior returns on high BM stocks are because they are 
fundamentally risker than low BM stocks. In addition, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and 
Vishny postulate that the BM effect is caused by naïve investors’ over-extrapolation of 
strong (weak) past earnings growth, which results in low (high) BM stocks to being 
temporally over (under) priced. As this optimism (pessimism) unravels over time, low 
(high) BM stocks will earn negative (positive) excess returns. La Porta (1997) shows 
that an investment strategy that seeks to exploit errors in analyst’s forecasts is highly 
profitable. Low earning expectation stocks, on average, beat high earning expectation 
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stocks by 20% p.a. La Porta’s research suggests even sophisticated investors such as 
analysts make forecasts that are too extreme. 
Agency factors may play a role in higher prices of low BM stocks. Stickel (1998) 
finds that, in the U.S, Wall Street tends to recommend investors buy glamour stocks 
with low BM ratios because glamour stocks have favorable characteristics, such as 
strong past earnings, strong price momentum, and positive earnings forecast, which 
makes these stocks easier to sell. Cai and Zheng (2004) argue that, because many 
institutional investors are required to follow the short-term benchmark, they chase 
glamour stocks, regardless of their future long-term returns, such irrational behavior 
tends to push up the stock price and reduce expected future returns.  
 
2.2 Fundamental Analysis 
 
Fundamental investing relies on using publicly available financial statement 
information to predict future returns. Ball and Brown (1968) show that stock prices 
reflect a firm's fundamentals. They build a forward-looking model to show that 
abnormal returns can be earned if one can perfectly forecast a company’s future 
earnings. They also show that, by the time a company releases its annual report, 80% 
of the information is already incorporated in the stock price. Ball and Brown's work is 
the cornerstone of the fundamental investing strategy. 
Ou and Penman (1989) test whether historical financial information has any 
predictive power concerning future earnings. They start with a pool of 68 financial 
ratios derived from publicly available information. Next, they select the most relevant 
ratios and combine them into a single measure called Pr. They show an investment 
strategy based on Pr yields 8.3% (14.5%) abnormal return for a 12 (24)-month buy-
and-hold period. Holthausen and Larcker (1992) use a similar approach to predict stock 
returns directly, and find that their fundamental strategy yields 4.3%-9.5% abnormal 
return per year. One of the criticisms of the models of Ou and Penman (1989), and 
Holthausen and Larcker (1992) is the risk of overfitting the data, and the high cost 
7 
 
associated with obtaining the data. 
To address this limitation of the models of Ou and Penman (1989) and Holthausen 
and Larcker (1992), Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) utilize a simplified model and 12 
financial ratios that are commonly used by financial analysts. Lev and Thiagarajan 
show all 12 financial ratios have the expected sign, and 7 out of the 12 financial ratios 
are statistically significant. Their research results suggest these financial ratios are 
value-relevant, and are positively correlated with future stock returns. Furthermore, 
they show that the result is strengthened after adjusting for macroeconomic and other 
variables. Using the same set of financial ratios, Abarbanell and Bushee (1997, 1998) 
confirm Lev and Thiagarajan (1993)’s finding. They show that investment strategies 
based on these financial ratios yield abnormal returns. Frenkel and Lee (1998) show a 
firm’s intrinsic value can be estimated using consensus data with a residual income 
model. Their investment strategy generates significant positive returns. However, a 
limitation of their approach is that forward-looking data such as analyst’s forecasts are 
not always available.  
Other fundamental investment strategies focus on individual variables derived 
from financial statements. For example, Sloan (1996) observes that firms with high 
(low) accruals experience negative(positive) future returns. Novy-Marx (2012) shows 
gross profitability defined as gross profit over asset is effective at predicting a stock’s 
cross-section of returns. These accounting-based investment strategies only require the 
calculation of one accounting ratio, and rely on a simple ranking method to form the 
stock portfolio. 
 
2.3 Fundamental Analysis on Value and Growth Stocks 
 
The characteristics of high BM stocks makes them suitable for fundamental analysis. 
The lack of analysts following the market makes it difficult for investors to access 
value-relevant information, other than historical financial statements. Financial 
statements therefore become a major source of information for investors who want to 
analyze high BM firms. Because of the lack of high quality forecasts from analysts as 
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key input, intrinsic value models (e.g. Frank and Lee,1998) normally do not work well 
for high BM firms. Financial ratios derived from historical financial statements are 
therefore likely to be the most suitable tool for fundamental analysis.  
In general, low BM stocks are associate with growth and positive outlooks. 
However, not every low BM stock is a true growth stock. A portfolio of low BM stocks 
can consist of small cap hyped stocks with very little earnings, as well as large, high 
quality firms, with a high proportion of unrecorded intangible assets. Mohanram (2005) 
argues that, although traditional fundamental analysis may have limited applicability 
for growth firms, other information from financial statements can be useful. Mohanram 
investigates whether a simple strategy based on financial analysis of low BM firms is 
effective at differentiating between winners and losers. He creates a G-Score based on 
a combination of traditional fundamental signals and industry benchmarks. He shows 
that an investment strategy based on buying high G-Score and shorting low G-Score 
firms consistently earns abnormal returns. The main contribution of Mohanram’s work 
is that he shows fundamental analysis is not only useful for value stocks, but also useful 
for growth stocks. He finds that fundamental analysis is useful for low BM stocks 
because investors are overly optimistic about growth stocks’ future performance, and 
as a result glamour stocks are temporarily overpriced. Piotroski (2005) applies his F-
Score strategy to the growth stock sample and shows that the F-Score is also effective 
for separate winners and losers within a growth stock sample.  
 
2.4 Piotroski’s investment strategy 
 
2.4.1 Piotroski’s Investment idea 
 
Piotroski (2000) examines whether a simple accounting-based fundamental analysis 
can improve investment returns within a high BM firm sample. Piotroski observed that 
the average return of a high BM portfolio often outperforms the market. However, 
within the high BM portfolio, most the firms underperform the market, and the success 
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of the high BM portfolio relies on the strong performance of relatively few firms. 
Piotroski devised an accounting-based strategy (F-Score) for evaluating the financial 
strength of a firm. The F-Score is designed to differentiate fundamentally strong firms 
from fundamentally weak firms. Piotroski argues that high BM firms are most suitable 
for fundamental analysis because these firms are often neglected by analysts. As a group, 
high BM firms are thinly followed by analysts and receive low levels of interest from 
investors. Lack of dissemination channels means their stock price does not accurately 
reflect their true value. Financial statement analysis can therefore help investors 
identify under (over) priced stocks. Piotroski shows that his investment strategy can 
increase the return of a generic high BM portfolio by 7.5%, when selecting only the 
strong firms in the high BM firm sample. Furthermore, the strategy shifts the entire 
return distribution to the right. Even more impressive is that buying strong firms and 
shorting weak firms generated an average annual return of 23% over the study period, 
between 1976 and 1996. 
 
2.4.2 Performed Tests and Results 
 
To further examine whether the strategy really works, Piotroski (2000) evaluates a 
variety of issues. More specifically, he first tests whether the excess return earned is 
strictly a small size effect. He sorts the firms into three size categories and applies his 
F-Score strategy to each category. He finds the F-Score strategy is more effective with 
small and medium firms than with large firms. Particularly for small firms, the return 
difference between high F-score firms and the entire firm sample increased from 7.5% 
to 8.7%, and the return difference between high and low F-Score firms increased from 
23% to 27%. By contrast, for large firms, the return difference between high and low 
F-score firms is much smaller, and statistically insignificant. Piotroski also examines 
the effectiveness of his F-Score after controlling for the share price, trading volume and 
analysts’ following. He finds that the F-Score strategy is most effective for firms that 
have low share prices, low trading volumes, and ones that no analyst is following. 
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Second, Piotroski investigates whether the F-Score adds any value for explaining 
stock returns, beyond previously known anomalies. He estimates a regression model 
with the following variables: Market capitalization, BM ratio (Fama and French, 1992), 
momentum (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok, 1996), accrual (Sloan, 1996), equity 
offering (Loughran and Ritter, 1995) and F-Score (Piotroski, 2000). The regression 
results were as follows, 1) the coefficient of the F-Score is positive and statistically 
significant, 2) after he includes the F-Score in the regression, previously known 
anomalies, such as market capitalization, BM ratio and momentum are still statistically 
significant. However, accruals and equity offering are not statistically significant.  
Third, Piotroski partitions the high BM sample based on financial distress 
measured by Altman’s Z-score (1968) and historical change in profitability, measured 
by ROA. He finds that firms with high returns have low distress risk and high ROA, 
and, furthermore, that the F-Score is robust in all partitions. This means the F-Score has 
explanatory power above and beyond commonly accepted financial health measures 
such as Altman’s Z-score and ROA. 
Fourth, Piotroski shows that the F-Score is positively correlated with a firm’s 
subsequent performance, measured by ROAt+1, and negatively correlated with the 
probability of delisting. His results suggest F-Score firms out-perform low F-Score 
firms because they have higher future earnings. This finding contradicts Fama and 
French (1995), who show that high BM firms have poor subsequent earnings.  
 
2.4.3 Follow-Up Study 
 
Mohr (2010) tested the effectiveness of the F-Score for a Eurozone low BM firm sample, 
between 1999 and 2010. Mohr finds the F-score can be an effective tool for separating 
winners and losers. High F-Score portfolios consistently outperform low F-Score 
portfolios over the entire sample period. 
Rathjens and Schellhove (2011) investigate whether Piotroski's F-score can 
successfully be applied to the U.K market. They divide firms into five quantiles 
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according to the BM ratio, and test the effectiveness of Piotroski's F-score in both the 
top (high BM firm portfolio) and bottom (low BM firm portfolio) quantiles. They find 
Piotroski's F-Score works well when applied to the U.K market, as well as in the low 
BM firm sample, but they find his F-Score does not generate significant returns in the 
high BM firm portfolio. In addition, Rathjens and Schellhove show there was no clear 
indication for a decrease in abnormal returns after the publishing of Piotroski’s paper. 
Hyde (2013) examines the F-Score in a global emerging market context. The 
universe is the constituents of the MSCI Emerging Market Index, which consist of 21 
countries, including China. Hyde shows that Piotroski's F-score is highly effective for 
South Korea, India, South East Asia, China, and South Africa, and the result is robust, 
after controlling for firm size, momentum, holding period, and value. The return 
difference between high and low F-Score portfolios in China is 12.49%.  
A study by Galdi and Broedel, Lopes (2009) finds that the F-score is effective when 
applied to the Brazilian stock market. However, the return is mainly driven by small, 
low liquidity firms. Attwood (2012) tests the F-Score using Piotroski’s original 
methodology and finds that, in South Africa, high F-score firms earn higher returns than 
low F-Score firms, but the result is not statistically significant. Also in south Africa, 
Pullen (2013) uses a quarterly rebalancing strategy instead of an annual rebalancing 
strategy and shows that the F-Score strategy is both economically and statistically 
significant.  
 
3. Data and Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Sample Selection  
 
All historical financial statement data, financial report release date, suspension lists, 
stock prices, and trading volumes are obtained from the Wind database . All delisted 
stocks are included, to avoid survivorship bias. We use data from April 2006 to October 
2014. Although the Wind database has data before 2006, we exclude them, because 
12 
 
these data are not suitable for this study. Prior to 2006, Chinese companies were 
required to prepare financial statement using the Chinese Accounting Standard (CAS) 
from the socialist period. Under these Chinese Accounting Standards, treatment of 
many financial statement items is vastly different than the way these are handled in 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or the U.S Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP).  
We start with all the firms in the CSI300 index. First, and then exclude banks and 
diversified financials, as gross profits are not available for these firms. This approach 
is consistent with prior studies on F-Score, such as those of Rathjens and Schellhove 
(2011), and Mohr (2010). Second, we remove all firms with 30-day average trading 
volume less than 10 million RMB. Using this liquidity filter, ensures that stocks in the 
sample are liquid enough for investors to trade. It also reduces the chance of picking 
limit-up or limit-down stocks. Third, using the suspension list provide by the Wind 
Database, we identify firms that are suspended, to ensure that the trading strategy does 
not generate buy/sell signals for stocks that cannot be traded. Fourth, we remove all 
negative BM ratio observations in the sample, because they cannot be classified as 
either value or growth stocks.  
Unlike Piotroski (2000), who used only high BM stocks, our study considers both 
high and low BM stocks. The decision to extend the sample scope is mainly motivated 
by Mohr (2010) and Rathjens and Schellhove (2011). Both studies show that the success 
of Piotroski’s F-Score is not confined to the high BM quantile. Including both high and 
low BM stocks allow us to test whether the F-Score strategy works, irrespective of firms’ 
BM ratios. 
The Wind Database does not provide the book-to-market ratio. The BM ratio is 
therefore obtained by inverting the Price-to-Book ratio. For each month, BM ratios are 
ranked. We classify low BM stocks as firms with BM ratios below the 33th percentile, 
while firms with BM ratios above the 66th percentile are classified as high BM stocks. 




3.2 Return Calculation  
 
To calculate stock returns, we use forward adjusted price series from the Wind database. 
The forward adjusted price series has taken into account all cash and stock dividends, 
as well as other corporate actions. Hence it reflects the total return of a stock, under the 
assumption that cash dividends are reinvested immediately at zero cost. Returns are 
measured as one-month buy-and-hold returns. Measurement of these returns for month 
t commences on the first trading day of month t, until the first trading day of month t+1, 
i.e. all stocks are assumed bought and sold at the closing price on the first trading day 
of month t. If a firm is delisted during the holding period, we assume the return of that 
stock is zero, in line with Piotroski (2000). The market index used in this study is the 
CSI 300 total return index. The CSI 300 Index is a value-weighted index consisting of 
the 300 largest companies in China, based on free float market capitalization.  
 
3.3 Piotroski’s F-Score 
 
Piotroski (2000) chose nine simple fundamental signals to measure the overall financial 
strength of a firm, related to three areas: profitability, financial leverage/liquidity, and 
operating efficiency. Each fundamental signal is a binary variable which may only take 
on a value of either zero or one. A variable is equal to one if the signal’s realization is 
good, and zero otherwise. The F-Score is defined as the sum of nine binary variables. 
The highest possible financial strength corresponds to a score of nine, the lowest to a 
score of zero. All firms publish financial data in quarterly basis, for all the formulas 








Category 1: Signals based on Earning and Cash Flow Profitability   
 
Return on Asset (ROA) 
 
F_ROA- return on assets: F_ROA is defined as a firm’s 12-month trailing profit before 
extraordinary items, scaled by total asset at the beginning of the year. If F_ROA is 
positive, one point is awarded, and zero otherwise.  
 
 ROA(t) =  






Change in ROA (ΔROA) 
 
F_ΔROA- Change in return on asset: F_ΔROA is defined as the current year’s ROA 
minus last year’s ROA. This variable gives an indication of the trend of a firm’s 
profitability. If F_ΔROA is positive, one point is awarded, and zero otherwise. 
  
∆ROA(t) = ROA(t) - ROA(t-4) 
 
 
Cash flow from operations(CFO) 
 
F_CFO- Cash flow from operations: F_CFO is defined as the 12-month trailing cash 
flow from operating activities, scaled by total asset at the beginning of the year. Firms 
which generate a positive cash flow are more likely to stay solvent and be less 
dependent on external debt. If F_CFO is positive, one point is awarded, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
CFO(t) =  










F_Accrual: F_Accrual is defined as ROA – CFO. Accruals measure the quality of 
earnings. Sloan (1996) provides evidence that positive accruals could be indicative of 
lower subsequent earnings and management of earnings. If F_Accrual is negative, one 
point is awarded, and zero otherwise. 
 
Accrual(t) = ROA(t) – CFO(t) 
 
Category 2: Signals based on Leverage, liquidity, and source of fund   
 
Change in Leverage(ΔLeverage) 
 
F_ΔLeverage- change in long-term leverage: The long-term debt asset ratio is defined 
as total long-term debt (including the portion of long-term debt classified as current), 
scaled by average total assets for the year. Highly levered balance sheets could be 
indicative of risk of insolvency, and an increase in leverage is regarded as a negative 
sign because it is indicative of a firm’s inability to generate internal funding. If 




















Change in Liquidity(ΔLiquidity) 
 
F_ΔLiquidity - Change in current ratio: Current ratio is defined as total current assets 
divide by total current liabilities. If F_ΔLiquidity is negative, then one point is awarded, 




 ∆Liquidity(t)  = 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(𝑡)  
 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠(𝑡)
  -  




Change in Equity 
 
EQ - change in number of shares outstanding: If the current number of shares is less 
than the number of shares 12 months ago, then one point is awarded, and zero otherwise. 
Our calculation of the number of shares is adjusted for stock split. 
 
Category 3: Signals based on operating efficiency 
 
Change in Gross margin (ΔMargin) 
 
ΔMargin - change in gross margin: Gross margin is defined as sales less cost of sales 
(12-month trailing). If ΔMargin is greater than one, then one point is awarded, and zero 
otherwise.  
 
















Change in asset turnover (ΔTurnover) 
 
ΔTurnover- change in asset turnover. Asset turnover is defined as 12-month trailing net 
sales scaled by total average. If ΔTurnover is greater than zero, then one point is 
awarded, and zero otherwise. 
 























The aggregated F-Score is the sum of the individual binary signals. Mathematically, F-
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Score is defined as follows: 
 
F_Score = F_ROA + F_ΔROA + F_CFO + F_Accrual + F_Leverage  
+ F_Liqudity +F_EQ + F_ΔMargin + F_ΔTurnover 
 
In this study, we ensure that the information needed for calculation of the F-Score 
and BM ratio is already available when the portfolio is formed (to avoid forward-
looking bias). For example, if a firm’s year-end report is released on 27th April, then for 
the March portfolio we only use 12-month trailing data up to the third quarter for that 
stock. 
In this analysis, firms with F-Scores of seven or greater are classified as high score 
firms, and firms with F-scores of two or less are classified as low score firms. Since all 
buy and sell signals are generated on the last day of month t-1, we know precisely the 
weighting of each stock in the portfolio. The return of the portfolio is calculated based 
on the equally-weighted return of each stock in the portfolio. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
The empirical results are reported as the equally-weighted average one-month buy-and-
hold returns. In this section, we first present the descriptive statistics of the high and 
low BM firm portfolio, then the returns of the F-Score strategy, conditioned on BM 
ratio, and, finally the returns of partition analysis, conditioned on size, liquidity and 
analyst coverage. 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A of table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of firms in the sample, for all firm-
year observations. The average high BM firm has a mean (median) market 
capitalization of 24,516 (3,917) million. The large difference between mean and median 
indicates the presence of some very large firms in the high BM sample. In contrast to 
18 
 
Piotroski (2000) the average firm’s ROA is positive, with a mean and median of 0.036 
(0.027), and 90% firms earn a positive profit. Furthermore, the average high BM firm 
saw an increase in CFO and a decrease in accrual.  
Low BM firms are much smaller than the high BM firms in terms of capitalization 
and assets. This result is expected, because most of the low BM firms are small growth 
firms. Consistent with Fama and French (1995), the average low BM firm earns higher 
ROA than the average high BM firm. In addition, the average low BM firm also saw an 
increase in ROA. However, the average low BM firm has negative cash flows, and their 
leverage (liquidity) is higher (lower) than in the previous year. 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the returns for both high and low BM portfolios. The 
mean market-adjusted return of high (low) BM firms is 0.38% (-0.49%). Consistent 
with Laknoshok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), high (low) BM firms earn positive 
(negative) market-adjusted returns, following portfolio formation. The median of the 
high (low) BM firm portfolio is -0.74% (-1.13%), indicating that the majority of the 
firms underperform the market. Comparing the return distribution of our low BM firm 
portfolio to the return distribution of Our high BM firm portfolio, we discover that the 
low BM firm portfolio has a wider return distribution. If the F-Score strategy can 
eliminate the firms in the left tail of the return distribution, then the F-Score should be 
more effectively applied to the low BM firms than to the high BM firms. 
 
4.2 Return of Piotroski’s Strategy 
 
As the F-Score consists of nine signals, it can have ten values, from zero to nine. Due 
to too few observations in portfolio 0, we decide to merge portfolio 0 and portfolio 1, 
and, as a result, portfolio 1 consists of all firms with F-Scores of 0 and 1. Table 2 
presents the returns to the F-Score strategy. Panel A of table 2 shows that most of the 
observations are clustered around the F-Score between 3 and 7, indicating that the vast 
majority of the firms have conflicting performance signals, which is consistent with 
Piotroski (2000). The high score portfolio, on average earns 0.48%, the low score 
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portfolio on average earns -0.51%. The return difference is 0.98%, statistically 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that the long high F-Score portfolio and short low 
F-Score portfolio may be very effective. 
Unlike Piotroski (2000), we find the F-Score does not work within the high BM 
firm sample. Although high score firms earn a return of 0.67%, and they outperform 
low score firms by 0.65%, the t-statistics show that the return difference is not 
statistically significant. Furthermore, the F-Score strategy does not shift the return 
distribution of the high BM firm portfolio to the right. The 10th percentile of high (all) 
F-Score firms is -10.81% (-9.87%) and the 90th percentile is 11.89 (12.24%). The high 
score portfolio underperforms the generic high BM portfolio in the 10th and 90th 
percentile, indicating that the F-score strategy cannot eliminate the worst performing 
firms, and cannot identify the outperforming firms in the high BM firm sample. Figure 
1 shows the cumulative returns of long high score firms and short low score firms for 
high BM sample. As we can see the cumulative return is very flat for most the sample 
period, high score firms did not consistently outperform low score firms. Figure 1 may 
explain why our t-test is not statistically significant.  
On the other hand, Panel C shows the F-Score is working for the low BM firm 
sample. Consistent with Mohanram (2005), we find that firms in the high score portfolio 
earn positive but small market-adjusted returns, while firms in the low score portfolio 
earn large negative market-adjusted returns. This indicates that the F-Score strategy is 
more effective at identifying potential underperforming stocks in the low BM firm 
portfolio. The mean return of the high (low) score portfolio is 0.23% (-1.05%), the 
return difference is 1.28%, and statistically significant. When analyzing the return 
distribution in table 2, one can see that the F-Score strategy shifts the return distribution 
of the low BM firm portfolio to the right. The 25th percentile, median, 75th, and 90th 
returns of the high F-Score portfolio are significantly higher than the returns of the low 
F-Score portfolio, and the generic low BM portfolio. However, the 10th percentile of 
the high F-Score portfolio return is 0.31% lower than the low F-Score portfolio, and 
0.41% lower than the generic low BM portfolio. In contrast, the low F-Score portfolio 
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underperforms the generic low BM portfolio in all the percentiles. This indicates that 
the F-Score can successfully identify poor performing firms in the low BM firm 
portfolio. Figure 2 shows the cumulative returns of long high score firms and short low 
score firms for low BM sample. The cumulative return has a fairly consist upward trend 
which shows high score firms consistently outperform low score firms.  
 
Table 1 
Financial and Return Characteristics of Sample Firms between 2006 and 2014 
 
Table 1 shows the mean, median, and standard deviation of sample firms’ value on F-Score variables. F-
Score variables have been winsorized at 1% and 99%. Returns are calculated as the market adjusted one-
month buy-and-hold returns. n/a means that the value is not available.    
 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev % Positive
MVE 24,516                3,917      128,555      n/a
Asset 79,783                3,590      758,767      n/a
BM ratio 0.715 0.682 0.732 n/a
ROA 0.036 0.027 0.075 0.900
∆ROA -0.004 -0.003 0.086 0.430
∆Margin -0.004 -0.004 0.058 0.446
CFO 0.006 0.008 0.033 0.641
∆Liqudity -0.072 -0.022 0.718 0.459
∆Leverage 0.004 0.000 0.059 0.338
∆Turnover -0.004 -0.004 0.058 0.446
Accural -0.005 -0.005 0.075 0.444
Panel A2 : Financial Characteristics of Low BM firms
MVE 12,145                2,752      59,514        n/a
Asset 10,120                1,824      89,751        n/a
BM ratio 0.142 0.194 0.256 n/a
ROA 0.070 0.050 0.105 0.910
∆ROA 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.500
∆Margin -0.001 -0.002 0.060 0.474
CFO -0.054 -0.062 0.598 0.414
∆Liqudity -0.109 -0.012 0.910 0.473
∆Leverage 0.004 0.000 0.054 0.267
∆Turnover -0.001 -0.002 0.060 0.474
Accural 0.002 -0.002 0.090 0.476
Panel B : One-Month Market Adjusted Buy-and-Hold Returns 
Mean 25% 75% % positive
Low BM -0.49% -7.57% 5.88% 45.26%
High BM 0.38% -5.02% 4.64% 45.88%





Returns to an Investment Strategy Based on F-Score 
 
Table 2 presents one-month buy-and-hold market adjusted returns, The F-Score is equal to the sum of 
nine individual variables. Or F-Score = F_ROA + F_ΔROA + F_CFO + F_Accrual + F_Leverage + 
F_Liqudity + F_EQ + F_ΔMargin + F_ΔTurnover. Where each binary signal equals one (zero) if the 
variable indicates improved (deteriorated) future performance. The high (low) score portfolio consists of 
firms with an aggregate score of 7,8, or 9 (0,1, or 2). The F-Score 1 group consists of firms with an 
aggregate score of 0 or 1. t-statistics for mean returns are from two-sample t-tests assuming unequal 
variance. Significance levels using two-tailed tests are represented by ***1% level; **5% level; *10% 
level.     
 
 
F-Score N Mean 0.1 0.25 Median 0.75 0.9 % Positive
1 217 -0.96% -13.54% -7.43% -1.91% 4.79% 15.96% 38.71%
2 1141 -0.42% -11.25% -6.68% -1.47% 4.72% 12.38% 43.56%
3 3032 -0.23% -11.59% -6.36% -0.95% 5.26% 12.65% 44.59%
4 5007 -0.21% -11.50% -6.16% -1.08% 5.09% 12.68% 44.44%
5 5871 -0.07% -11.76% -6.28% -1.02% 5.16% 13.10% 45.00%
6 4989 -0.15% -12.42% -6.30% -0.94% 5.15% 13.21% 45.28%
7 3431 0.26% -12.05% -5.99% -0.58% 5.65% 13.66% 46.93%
8 1890 0.20% -11.93% -6.19% -0.75% 5.68% 14.03% 46.93%
9 419 0.28% -12.14% -5.76% -0.45% 5.26% 12.81% 49.16%
Low -0.51% -11.45% -6.79% -1.62% 4.74% 12.49% 42.78%
High 0.48% -12.14% -5.90% -0.52% 5.69% 13.83% 47.46%
High-Low 0.98% -0.69% 0.89% 1.11% 0.95% 1.34%
t-statistic 3.01***
p-value 0.003










F-Score N Mean 0.1 0.25 Median 0.75 0.9 % Positive
1 79 -0.21% -9.47% -6.02% -2.23% 2.49% 12.50% 34.18%
2 386 0.06% -9.73% -5.40% -1.17% 4.20% 12.06% 43.78%
3 988 0.34% -9.84% -5.22% -0.61% 4.29% 12.27% 45.45%
4 1581 0.45% -9.57% -4.95% -0.82% 4.85% 11.81% 45.98%
5 2045 0.40% -9.69% -5.03% -0.93% 4.62% 12.68% 45.09%
6 1566 0.12% -10.34% -5.19% -0.87% 4.53% 12.50% 44.83%
7 949 0.77% -9.72% -4.84% -0.02% 5.17% 11.94% 49.84%
8 631 0.31% -10.81% -4.69% -0.78% 4.55% 11.66% 45.96%
9 156 1.58% -8.37% -3.95% 0.72% 5.37% 12.47% 55.13%
All 0.38% -9.87% -5.02% -0.74% 4.64% 12.24% 45.88%
Low 0.02% -9.58% -5.67% -1.40% 3.81% 12.29% 42.15%
High 0.67% -10.81% -4.68% -0.23% 4.97% 11.89% 48.91%
High-Low 0.66% -1.24% 0.99% 1.17% 1.16% -0.40%
t-statistic 1.27
p-value 0.20
Panel B :High BM Firms
F-Score N Mean 0.1 0.25 Median 0.75 0.9 % Positive
1 69 -3.3% -21.0% -10.6% -1.7% 6.3% 11.2% 43.5%
2 349 -0.6% -12.7% -7.7% -1.4% 5.4% 13.2% 45.3%
3 1048 -1.0% -13.6% -7.9% -1.6% 5.6% 12.3% 43.0%
4 1645 -0.9% -13.3% -7.5% -1.3% 5.6% 13.2% 44.1%
5 1883 -0.6% -13.6% -7.7% -1.3% 5.7% 14.1% 44.8%
6 1818 -0.5% -14.1% -7.5% -1.0% 5.8% 13.5% 45.8%
7 1356 0.2% -14.0% -7.3% -0.8% 6.5% 14.7% 46.2%
8 657 0.5% -12.0% -6.9% -0.3% 6.4% 15.2% 49.6%
9 113 -0.7% -14.8% -9.1% -1.3% 7.0% 13.5% 45.1%
All -0.5% -13.6% -7.6% -1.1% 5.9% 13.7% 45.3%
Low -1.1% -13.7% -8.1% -1.6% 5.5% 12.7% 45.0%
High 0.2% -14.0% -7.3% -0.7% 6.5% 14.8% 47.2%
High-Low 1.3% -0.3% 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% 2.1%
t-statistic 2.01**
p-value 0.045
Panel C :Low BM Firms
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Figure 1 Cumulative hedged returns to an investment strategy based on F-Score (high  
BM sample)  
 
 
Figure 2 Cumulative hedged returns to an investment strategy based on F-Score (low  











4.3 Portion Analysis 
 
A concern of any investment strategy is whether the strategy picks a set of firms that 
are small, or thinly traded. If this is the case, such an investment strategy will be very 
difficult to implement in real life. Piotroski (2000) proposes four firm assessment 
characteristics: size, trading volume, analyst following, and share price. In this analysis, 
we follow a similar approach except we do not use share price as an indicator of stock 
liquidity, because in China low share price stocks are often the most liquid. 
 
4.3.1 Size Partition 
 
The median value of market capitalization is calculated at the last day of month t-1, 
based on the entire sample. Any firm with market capitalization above (below) the 
median is classified as a large (small) firm. Within the large (small) firm sample, we 
further separate firms into high BM firms and low BM firms.  
Panel A1 of table 3 presents the return by size of the high BM firm sample. For the 
large (small) firm sample the return of the high score portfolio is 0.06% (1.35%), the 
return of the low score portfolio is -0.36% (0.22%), the return difference is therefore 
0.34% (0.68%). t-statistics indicate that the return difference is not statistically 
significant for both the small and large firm samples. The return difference of the small 
firm sample is larger than the return difference of the large firm sample, consistent with 
Piotroski (2000), who finds that his F-Score works better in small firms.  
Panel A1 of table 3 presents the return by size partition of the low BM firm sample. 
For large(small) firms the return of the high score portfolio is -0.05% (0.69%), the 
return of the low score portfolio is -1.44% (-0.81%), and therefore the return difference 
is 1.39% (1.50%). t-statistics indicate the return difference is statistically significant at 
the 10% level for both the large and small firm samples. It is worth noting that the 
success of the F-Score strategy in the large firm sample relies heavily on the ability to 
short low F-Score firms. When analyzing the returns of the small and large firm samples, 
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it is clear that the small firms outperform the large firms. this result is consistent with 
Cheung, Hoguet and Ng (2015). If an investor wants to capture the small-cap and BM 
premium, they could buy small high BM firms with high F-Scores and short large low 
BM firms with low F-Scores. This investment strategy yields a market-adjusted return 
of 2.79% per month, which is equivalent to 39.13% per annum (if compounded). 
Overall, our research result is consistent with the findings of Piotroski (2000) and 
Mohanram (2005), both papers show fundamental analysis works better in small firm 
samples than in large firm samples. However, Piotroski (2000) finds his F-Score 
strategy is not statistically significant in the large firm sample. In contrast, we find the 
F-Score strategy is equally effective for the small and large firm samples.  
 
4.3.2 Liquidity partition 
 
The median value of the daily trading volume is calculated on the last day of month t-
1 and based on the full sample. Any firms with trading volumes above (below) the 
median is classified as high (low) liquidity firms. Within the high (low) liquidity firm 
sample we separate the high BM firms and low BM firms. 
Panel B1 of table 3 presents the return by liquidity partition of the high BM firm 
sample. For high (low) liquidity firms the return of the high score portfolio is 0.28% 
(0.93%), the return of the low score portfolio is -0.10% (0.08%), and the return 
difference is 0.38% (0.85%). t-statistics indicate the return difference is not statistically 
significant for either the large or small firm sample.  
Panel B2 of Table 3 shows that, in the low BM firm sample, the benefit of the F-
Score strategy is concentrated in the low liquidity firm sample. For low liquidity firms 
the return of the high (low) score portfolio is 0.79% (-0.70%), the return difference is 
1.49% and it is statistically significant. In contrast, the return difference is not 
statistically significant in the high liquidity sample. The return difference for the high 
liquidity sample is quite high (1.30%). However, due to the high return volatility, the 
F-Score strategy failed the significance test in our high liquidity sample. The evidence 
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from the low BM firm sample suggests that the usefulness of the F-Score strategy is 




Returns to an Investment Strategy Based on F-Score by  
Size, liquidity, and Analyst Following  
  
 
4.3.3 Analyst Following  
 
The sample is divided into two groups: Firms that are not followed by analysts 
(neglected firms) and firms with an analyst following. Analyst following is calculated 
as the number of analysts who followed the firm in the past 180 days. The number of 
N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 
All 4520 0.91% 3809 0.17% All 3647 0.22% 5208 -0.44%
Low Score 299 0.22% 166 -0.36% Low Score 257 -0.81% 161 -1.44%
High Score 826 1.35% 910 0.06% High Score 789 0.69% 1337 -0.05%
High-Low 1.12% 0.42% High-Low 1.50% 1.39%
t-statistics 1.565 0.587 t-statistics 1.783* 1.702*
p-value 0.118 0.558 p-value 0.075 0.089
N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 
All 5124 0.74% 3199 0.31% All 3395 0.32% 5460 -0.48%
Low Score 301 0.08% 164 -0.10% Low Score 208 -0.70% 210 -1.41%
High Score 1052 0.93% 684 0.28% High Score 789 0.79% 1337 -0.11%
High-Low 0.85% 0.38% High-Low 1.49% 1.30%
t-statistics 1.39 0.40 t-statistics 1.65* 1.42
p-value 0.164 0.687 p-value 0.099 0.157
N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 
All 370 1.00% 7953 0.55% All 325 -1.01% 8530 -0.14%
Low Score 34 0.22% 431 -0.13% Low Score 20 -1.27% 398 -1.04%
High Score 50 1.93% 1686 0.63% High Score 77 -0.17% 2049 0.24%
High-Low 1.72% 0.76% High-Low 1.09% 1.28%
t-statistics 1.96* 1.42 t-statistics 0.358 1.97**
p-value 0.054 0.156 p-value 0.723 0.049
Panel B1 : One-Month MAR by Liquidty Partition
High BM
Panel A1 : One-Month MAR by Size Partition
Small Firms Large Firms 
Low BM
Panel A2 : One-Month MAR by Size Partition
Small Firms Large Firms 
Panel B2 : One-Month MAR by Liquidity Partition
No Analyst With Analyst No Analyst With Analyst 
Low Liquidity Firms High Liquidity Firms Low Liquidity Firms High Liquidity Firms 
Panel C1 : One-Month MAR by Analyst Following Partition Panel C2 : One-Month MAR by Analyst Following Partition
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firms in each group differs significantly: Fewer firms are not being followed by analysts. 
The number of firms being followed by analysts in the high (low) BM portfolio is 7953 
(8539). It seems there is no significant difference between the high and low BM firm 
samples in terms of number of analysts who follow these firms. This finding is not 
consistent with the findings of Stickel (1998), who finds that high BM firms are less 
likely to be covered by analysts.  
Panel C1 of Table 3 shows that, in the high BM firm sample, the F-Score strategy 
can successfully differentiate winners and losers within the sample of firms not being 
followed by analysts. The return of the high (low) score portfolio in the sample with no 
analyst following is 1.93% (0.22%), the return difference is 1.72% and it is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. This result is consistent with Piotroski (2000), who finds 
stocks are more likely to be mispriced if their coverage by analysts is low. Fundamental 
analysis is therefore most useful for such stocks. Within the high BM firm sample, the 
average firm with no analyst following sample earns 1.00%, while the average firm in 
the sample with an analyst following earns 0.55%. Again, this finding is consisting with 
Piotroski (2000). The high score portfolio in the sample with no analyst following earns 
1.93%, indicating that the market underprices the high quality ‘neglected’ firms. 
In contrast, Panel C2 of Table 3 shows that in the low BM firm sample, the F-Score 
strategy is significant in the sample with analyst following. The return of the high (low) 
score portfolio of firms with an analyst following is 0.24% (-1.04%). The return 
difference is 1.28%, statistically significant at the 5% level. The result contradicts the 
findings of Mohanram (2005), which was that fundamental analysis is more effective 
with firms which have no analyst coverage in the low BM firm sample. However, 
analysing the returns of the samples in the high and low score portfolios with analyst 
coverage, we discover that most of the profit from the F-Score strategy comes from 
shorting low score firms. This indicates that the market overprices the poor fundamental 





5. Analysis of Empirical Results 
 
5.1 High BM firm Sample 
 
Evidence from the previous section shows the F-score does not work for the high BM 
firm sample as a whole. A possible explanation is that the market has already 
incorporated all the fundamental information in the stock price at the time when the 
portfolio is formed, and the market is efficient for the high BM firm sample. 
Tables 4 and 5 present the evidence that could provide us with more insight as to 
why the F-Score does not work for the high BM firm sample. Panel A of Table 4 
presents the correlations for each of the F-Score signals, as well as the one-month buy-
and-hold market-adjusted return. Not all F-Score signals are positively correlated with 
Market-adjusted-returns (MAR). The correlation of F_Accrual and F_∆Liqudity with 
MAR is negative, indicating that obtaining a score of 1 for F_Accrual and F_∆Liqudity 
could negatively impact the returns of the F-Score strategy. In general, the correlation 
between the F-Score signal and the market adjusted return is fairly weak, indicating that 
the market has already priced in much of the information in the F-Score signal. Table 5 
shows the contribution of each F-Score signal to the F-Score strategy. The return 
differential is defined as the average return of firms with a score of 1, minus the average 
return of firms with a score of 0.  A one-tailed t-test is performed to test whether the 
average return of firms with a score of 1 is significantly higher than the average return 
of firms with a score of 0, and t-statistics are presented in the last column. Panel A of 
table 5 shows only the ROA demonstrating a statistically significant ability to separate 
firms. Seven signals are positively related to future returns, but these are not statistically 
significant. F_∆Liqudity shows a negative sign, and it is statistically significant. 
Conflicting signals within the F-Score is not expected, and, therefore, it is necessary to 
investigate the impact of not including F_∆Liqudity in the F-Score. The result of the 
analysis is presented in the next section. 
Another possible explanation for why the F-Score does not work within the high 
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BM firm sample could be the treatment of the returns of delisted firms. Like Piotroski 
(2000), we assume all delisted firms have zero returns. Such a simplified assumption is 
not realistic in practice. There are two types of delisting: The first is when firms that 
delist due to bad performance. The second is when firms delist due to mergers and 
acquisitions. Assuming that both types of delisting have zero returns is not realistic, 
because delistings due to bad performance are likely to result in large negative returns, 
whereas the latter type of delisting could result in large positive returns. Ma (2003) 
shows that, in China, firms earn significant market-adjusted returns after mergers and 
acquisitions. Although we identify the potential problem with our return calculation 
method, we cannot distinguish between type 1 and type 2 delistings, because of the lack 
of data. The impact of using simplified delisted returns on the return of the F-Score 
strategy is therefore not examined in this study.   
 
5.2 Low BM firms 
 
On the other hand, the F-Score works well for the low-BM firms. Panel B of Table 4 
shows that the correlation between F-Score and returns are all positive. Furthermore, 
the correlation between F-Score and MAR is significantly higher for low BM firms than 
for high BM firms. indicating that the F-Score is more effective when applied to a low 
BM firms than to high BM firms. It is worth noting that, in low BM firms F_Accrual 
(0.6%) and F_∆Liqudity (0.04%) are two of the weakest signals, and this shows that 
F_Accrual and F_∆Liqudity are not very effective for predicting future returns. Panel 
B of table 5 shows that five out of the nine signals in the F-Score show statistically 
significant ability to separate firms in terms of future returns. F_∆Liqudity and 
F_∆Leverage show negative signs. Again, evidence shows that F_∆Liqudity is not a 
useful signal for predicting future returns. Nevertheless, that F-Score works within low 
BM firm sample should not be a surprise, because prior studies such as those of 
Piotroski (2004), Rathjens and Schellhove (2011), and Mohr (2010) show that the F-








Rathejens and Schellhove (2011) point out, most of the F-Score signals can be regarded 
as a positive for both high and low BM firms. e.g F_ROA, F_∆ROA, F_∆Margin, 





MAR 0.032 0.004 0.020  -0.003 0.013  -0.024 0.009  0.003  0.004  0.016   
F1: F_ROA 1.000 0.085 0.181  -0.158 0.027  0.106  0.093  0.078  -0.088 0.316   
F2: F_CFO 1.000 0.061  0.620  0.143  -0.068 0.065  0.100  0.010  0.497   
F3: F_∆ROA 1.000  -0.018 0.010  0.106  0.258  0.468  -0.011 0.599   
F4: F_Accural 1.000  0.147  -0.094 0.014  0.048  0.092  0.419   
F5: F_∆Leverage 1.000  -0.178 -0.011 -0.023 -0.018 0.243   
F6: F_∆Liqudity 1.000  0.066  0.085  -0.007 0.261   
F7: F_∆Margin 1.000  0.100  0.038  0.430   
F8: F_∆Turnover 1.000  0.049  0.513   
F9: F_EQ 1.000  0.256   
MAR 0.012 0.016 0.022  0.006  0.010  0.000  0.035  0.013  0.023  0.034   
F1: F_ROA 1.000 0.112 0.261  -0.218 0.002  0.128  0.136  0.111  -0.173 0.310   
F2: F_CFO 1.000 0.023  0.488  0.092  -0.013 0.083  0.035  0.050  0.455   
F3: F_∆ROA 1.000  -0.089 -0.028 0.170  0.295  0.438  -0.009 0.584   
F4: F_Accural 1.000  0.113  -0.110 -0.002 0.019  0.179  0.368   
F5: F_∆Leverage 1.000  -0.141 0.014  -0.002 0.068  0.275   
F6: F_∆Liqudity 1.000  0.081  0.097  -0.064 0.304   
F7: F_∆Margin 1.000  0.057  -0.013 0.441   
F8: F_∆Turnover 1.000  0.093  0.491   
F9: F_EQ 1.000  0.314   
F8 F9F3 F4 F5 F6 F7
F8 F9 F-Score
F-Score
Panel A : High BM Firms
Panel B : Low BM Firms




5.3 Modified F-Score 
 
This section investigates the impact on returns, by removing F_∆Liqudity as a signal 
from the F-Score calculation. The key question we try to answer is if removing 
F_∆Liqudity from the original F-Score formula improves the returns of the F-Score 
strategy. We define a new F-Score model (Modified F-Score). The modified F-Score 
only has only 8 binaries, as F_∆Liqudity is removed from the original model. 
Everything else remains unchanged.  
Panel A of Table 6 presents the returns of the modified F-Score strategy for the high 
BM firm sample. The return difference of the F-Score strategy for the high BM sample 
improves, from 0.66% to 0.90%, and the return difference is statistically significant. 
The 10th (90th) percentile return difference of the high-low portfolio improves from -
1.24% (-0.40%) to -0.38% (-0.02%). In the low BM firm sample, the return difference 
of the F-Score strategy marginally increases from 1.28% to 1.29%. However, the 
modified F-Score improves 10th percentile returns of the high-low portfolio by 0.31%, 
and the return distribution of the modified F-Score is positive for all percentiles. The 
above evidence indicates that F_∆Liqudity may not be a useful signal. 
Table 5 
Relation between Individual F-Score Signals and future returns 
Table 5 shows the one-month buy-and-hold market adjusted return of individual F-Score signals and their 
significance. t-statistics for the mean difference are from two sample t-tests. Significance levels using 
one-tailed tests are represented by *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. Prefix “F_” is omitted for succinctness. 
 
Signal 1 0 Signal 1 0
Mean Mean (1)-(0) t-statistics Mean Mean (1)-(0) t-statistics
ROA 0.76% 0.17% 0.59% 1.84* ROA -0.16% -0.56% 0.40% 0.99
CFO 0.74% 0.37% 0.37% 1.42 CFO -0.09% -0.74% 0.65% 2.16**
∆ROA 0.90% 0.62% 0.29% 1.37 ∆ROA 0.14% -0.35% 0.49% 1.86*
Accural 0.67% 0.58% 0.09% 0.40 Accural -0.09% -0.39% 0.31% 1.17
∆Leverage 0.71% 0.70% 0.01% 0.06 ∆Leverage -0.26% -0.16% -0.10% 0.48
∆Liqudity 0.44% 0.90% -0.46% 2.20** ∆Liqudity -0.24% -0.13% -0.11% 0.47
∆Margin 0.81% 0.68% 0.13% 0.63 ∆Margin 0.27% -0.57% 0.83% 3.54***
∆Turnover 0.68% 0.70% -0.02% 0.12 ∆Turnover 0.06% -0.43% 0.49% 1.86*
EQ 0.70% 0.66% 0.04% 0.23 EQ 0.04% -0.52% 0.57% 2.39**




Return to an Investment Strategy Based on Modified F-Score 
 
Table 6 presents one-month buy-and-hold market adjusted returns, Mod_F-Score is equal to sum of eight 
individual variables. Or Mod_F-Score = F_ROA + F_ΔROA + F_CFO + F_Accrual + F_Leverage + 
F_EQ + F_ΔMargin + F_ΔTurnover. Where each binary signal equals to one(zero) if the variable 
indicates improved (deteriorated) future performance. The high (low) score portfolio consists of firms 
with an aggregate score of 7 or 8 (0,1, or 2). The F-Score 1 group consists of firms with an aggregate 
score of 0 or 1. t-statistics for mean returns are from two-sample t-tests assuming unequal variance. 
Significance levels using 2 tailed tests are represented by ***1% level; **5% level; *10% level.  
  
 
Mod_F_Score N Mean 0.1 0.25 Median 0.75 0.9 % Positive
1 168 -0.68% -9.78% -6.13% -2.24% 2.85% 12.44% 36.90%
2 612 0.07% -9.57% -4.86% -1.22% 4.22% 11.89% 43.79%
3 1163 0.53% -9.65% -5.22% -0.61% 4.49% 13.13% 45.83%
4 1959 0.50% -9.27% -4.94% -0.86% 4.83% 12.04% 45.74%
5 1872 0.28% -10.31% -5.16% -0.82% 4.57% 12.66% 45.41%
6 1403 0.02% -10.47% -5.27% -0.85% 4.31% 12.22% 45.69%
7 859 0.80% -10.39% -4.69% -0.25% 5.36% 12.72% 48.54%
8 351 0.83% -8.98% -4.11% 0.09% 5.00% 9.99% 50.71%
All 0.37% -9.89% -5.04% -0.77% 4.61% 12.34% 45.84%
Low -0.09% -9.61% -5.38% -1.48% 3.66% 12.17% 42.31%
High 0.81% -9.98% -4.57% -0.15% 5.24% 12.16% 49.17%
High-Low 0.90% -0.38% 0.81% 1.32% 1.58% -0.02%
t-statistic 2.02**
p-value 0.044
Mod_F_Score N Mean 0.1 0.25 Median 0.75 0.9 % Positive
1 130 -2.25% -20.96% -9.92% -0.81% 6.50% 11.83% 47.69%
2 574 -0.69% -12.67% -7.72% -1.93% 5.56% 12.83% 42.16%
3 1340 -1.22% -14.25% -7.88% -1.29% 5.15% 12.40% 43.66%
4 2021 -0.66% -12.87% -7.55% -1.36% 5.45% 13.28% 44.19%
5 1919 -0.15% -13.60% -7.15% -0.69% 6.40% 14.13% 47.11%
6 1714 -0.55% -14.33% -8.01% -1.33% 6.05% 14.53% 43.99%
7 978 0.44% -12.67% -7.07% -0.28% 6.62% 14.81% 49.08%
8 275 -0.14% -14.21% -7.69% -0.91% 6.29% 13.67% 47.64%
All -0.50% -13.64% -7.60% -1.10% 5.90% 13.70% 45.26%
Low -0.98% -13.36% -8.12% -1.88% 5.59% 12.51% 43.18%
High 0.31% -13.35% -7.23% -0.50% 6.48% 14.73% 48.76%
High-Low 1.29% 0.01% 0.89% 1.39% 0.89% 2.23%
t-statistic 2.31**
p-value 0.021
Panel A :High BM Firms
Panel B :Low BM Firms
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6. Performance of Piotroski’s F-Score Across Time  
 
6.1 Calendar year 
 
In this section, we examine the robustness of the F-Score strategy across time. First, we 
present the results of the performance of the F-Score for each calendar year between 
2006 and 2014. Second, we present the performance of the F-Score during reporting 
and non-reporting months.  
Table 7 shows the mean MAR for high and low score groups for each of the 
calendar years (2006-2014). For the high BM firm sample, the strategy is not very 
robust across time. In only five out of the nine years is the mean return difference 
positive, and in only two out of the nine years is the mean return difference statistically 
significant. In 2010 the negative mean return difference is statistically significant. On 
the other hand, for the low BM firm sample, the strategy is remarkably robust across 
time. The return difference is positive in nine out of the nine years, and in four out of 
the nine years the return difference is statistically significant. 
 
6.2 Reporting vs Non-Reporting Month 
 
In China, about 95% of the firms report year-end numbers between March and April, 
and 100% of the firms report first quarter numbers in April. 91% of the firms report 
mid-year numbers during August, and 100% of the firms report third quarter numbers 
during October. Based on this observation, we define March, April, August and October 
as reporting months, and the other months  as non-reporting months. 
Table 8 presents the returns of our long-short strategy (long high score firms, short 
low score firms) for reporting and non-reporting months. In the high BM firm sample, 
the long-short strategy earns 1.24% during reporting months, and the return is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. This result is consistent with Piotroski (2000) 
who finds that, for neglected firms (high BM firms), the F-Score strategy is most 
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effective during the period.  
  
Table 7 
Performance of F-Score Strategy Across Time 
 
Table 7 shows the mean one-month buy-and-hold market adjusted returns (MAR), as well as the 
difference between high and low score F-Score portfolios, and its significance from May 2006 to October 
2014. Returns are grouped by calendar year i.e, starting from January to December. t-statistics for mean 
returns are from two-sample t-tests assuming unequal variance. Significance levels using one-tailed tests 





Year Mean MAR Mean MAR Difference t-Statisitcs
2006 -2.32% -1.60% -0.72% 1.01
2007 1.36% 2.48% -1.12% 0.94
2008 1.92% 3.16% -1.24% 0.78
2009 2.44% 1.44% 1.00% 0.73
2010 -1.08% 0.31% -1.38% 1.39*
2011 0.86% -0.47% 1.33% 1.72*
2012 -0.05% -0.78% 0.72% 0.89
2013 0.60% -0.73% 1.33% 1.35*
2014 -2.31% -3.28% 0.98% 0.71
Year Mean MAR Mean MAR Difference t-Statisitcs
2006 -1.45% -2.43% 0.98% 1.45*
2007 -0.15% -3.37% 3.21% 1.62*
2008 -0.30% -3.14% 2.84% 1.52*
2009 0.67% -0.59% 1.27% 1.12
2010 1.83% 1.56% 0.27% 0.78
2011 -0.51% -1.07% 0.56% 0.96
2012 0.11% -0.78% 0.88% 0.76
2013 1.14% -0.17% 1.30% 0.91
2014 -1.89% -4.53% 2.63% 1.43*
Low ScoreHigh Score
High Score Low Score
Panel B : Low BM Firms 




Performance of F-Score Strategy for Reporting and Non-Reporting Months 
 
Table 8 shows the long-short profit of the F-Score strategy for reporting and non-reporting months. 
Reporting months are March, April, August, and October. The rest are classified as non-reporting months. 
t-statistics for mean returns are from two-sample t-tests assuming unequal variance. Significance levels 
using two-tailed tests are represented by ***1% level; **5% level; *10% level.  
 
 
when new fundamental information is released. My results also show that markets react 
to new information very quickly. As we can see, the excess return disappears in the 
month after the release of the financial report. 
In the low BM firm sample, long-short strategy earns -1.31% during reporting 
months, and 2.38% during non-reporting months. Both returns are statistically 
significant. This means market participants tend to misprice low BM firms when the 
flow of new information is at its peak. It is beyond the scope of this study to investigate 
the cause of such irrational behavior. The results in this study suggest that high F-Score 
stocks are temporarily underpriced, and low F-Score stocks are temporarily overpriced 
during reporting months. However, in the month after the release of a financial report, 
the market slowly corrects the mispricing. As a result, large excess returns are earned 
during non-reporting months.  
To sum up, in the high BM sample the evidence supports the “neglect hypothesis”, 
which states that the lack of a dissemination channel causes stock prices not to 
accurately reflect their true fundamental. The market corrects the mispricing when new 
financial information is released. In the low BM sample, the evidence shows that the 
profitability of the F-Score strategy is driven by irrational pricing. 
Mean Mean 
Long-Short Return Long-Short Return
High BM 33 1.24%* 68 -0.08% -1.32% -1.012
Low BM 33 -1.31%** 68 2.38%*** 3.70% 2.45**
Reporting Month Non-Reporting Month
N N Difference t-Statisitcs
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7. Regression Analysis  
 
The results in the previous sections show that the F-Score is effective at differentiating 
winners and losers in the all-share sample, as well as in the low BM firm sample. 
However, at this point, it is still unclear whether the observed returns are correlated 
with other well-documented risk factors. We therefore evaluate whether the observed 
returns are correlated with known risk factors, by regressing the stock returns on the 
following control variables: BM measured as the log of book-to-market ratio, and Size, 
measured as the log of market capitalization. Prior studies, such as those of Piotroski 
(2000), Mohanram (2005), and Mohr (2010) include accrual, momentum, and equity 
offering as known risk factors in their regression analyses, when assessing whether the 
F-Score is effective after controlling for known risk factors. Other studies use accrual 
(Sloan, 1996), and recent equity offerings (Loughran ad Ritter, 1995), both of which 
have been shown to predict future stock returns in the U.S market. However, no studies 
show that these two factors have the same effect in China, and we therefore do not 
include accruals and equity offerings in our regression model. Xiao and Xu (2004) show 
that the momentum effect is not significant in China, and therefore momentum is also 
not included in our model as a known risk factor. We estimate the following regressions, 
each with and without the F-score as an independent variable. 
 
Ri = α + β1 log (SIZEi) + β2 log (BMi) + β3 F-Score        (1) 
 
MARi = α + β1 log (SIZEi) + β2 log (BMi) + β3 F-Score       (2) 
 
Ri is the raw return of stock i and MARi is the market-adjusted return of stock i. If 
the market is efficient and Size and BM already incorporate all risks, adding the F-
Score as an additional risk factor should not significantly increase the explanatory 
power（R2）of the regression model. In addition, the coefficient of the F-Score (β3) 
should not be significant.  
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The result of the regression analysis is presented in table 9. Panel A1 shows all 
coefficients of the base regression model have the expected sign. The coefficient of Size 
is negative, which shows the presence of the small-size effect. The coefficient of BM 
is positive, which shows the presence of the BM effect. t-statistics show both variables 
are statistically significant at the 1% level. Adding the F-Score to the base regression 
model increases R2 from 1.83% to 1.91%. Low R2 is expected when regressing returns 
on risk factors instead of on risk premiums. The coefficient of the F-Score is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. After adding the F-Score to the model we 
find that Size and BM are still statistically significant, indicating that the F-Score is 
independent of the other three risk factors. Hence the F-Score adds value even after 
controlling for known risk factors. 
Panel A2 shows that, in the high BM firm sample, the size effect is still present. 
However, the coefficient of BM becomes negative, and the t-statistics show it is not 
statistically significant. This result is reasonable, since we already control for the BM 
effect in the high BM firm sample. The coefficient is positive, but not statistically 
significant. Adding the F-Score only increases R2 by 0.002%, and the increase is 
negligent if we round R2 to two decimal places. The F-Score therefore does not add 
value in the high BM firm sample. The regression result is consistent with our prior 
results.  
 Panel A3 shows that, in the low BM firm sample, the coefficient of Size is positive 
and statistically significant, but the coefficient of BM is not significant. The coefficient 
of the F-Score is positive and statistically significant. Furthermore, adding the F-Score 
to the base regression increases R2 from 1.66% to 1.76%. Hence the F-Score adds value 
in the low BM portfolio even after controlling for known risk factors. 
 Panel B1, B2, and B3 show the results of regressing MAR against risk factors and 
the F-Score. The result is almost identical to the result shown in Panel A. The results 
shown in Panel B indicate that the F-Score still adds value in all share portfolios and 
the low BM portfolio after adjusting for market return, as well as known risk factors. 
In Panel B3 we see that the coefficient of the F-Score is 0.16%, which means every 
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point improvement in the F-Score will result in a 0.16% increase in MAR.  
 
8.Characteristic of the F-Score Portfolio 
 
So far we have shown that the high F-Score portfolio outperforms the low F-Score 
portfolio. However, it is not clear whether the outperformance is a result of pure market 
mispricing, or whether the high F-Score portfolio exhibits higher risk than the low F-
Score portfolio. Tantipanichkul (2011) shows that high F-Score portfolios have 
significantly higher beta than low F-Score portfolios. However, other studies, such as 
those of Mohr (2010) and Noma (2010) show that there is no significant difference 
between high F-Score and low F-Score portfolios in terms of risk. The first part of this 
section presents evidence concerning whether a high score portfolio is riskier than a 
low score portfolio, using two common risk measures: Beta and standard deviation. The 
second part of this section presents the fundamental characteristics of high F-Score 
portfolios and low F-Score portfolios. A high F-Score indicates that a firm’s 
fundamental is improving. However, a high F-Score does not necessarily indicate that 
a firm is a high-quality firm. In the second part of this section, we examine whether the 















Regression analysis: Controlling for Risk Factors 
  
Table 9 presents the results of regressing the one-month raw and market adjusted (MAR) return on BM, 




Return = α + β1 log (SIZEi) + β2 log (BMi) + β3 F-Score 
Significance level represented by ***1% level; **5% level; *10% level. 
 
 
8.1 Portfolio Risks 
 
Beta and volatility are calculated using weekly return, ensuring that there are at least 
100 weeks of data available. In the high BM firm sample, the risk of the high F-Score 
portfolio is much smaller than that of the low F-Score portfolio. The mean betas of the 
high and low F-Score portfolios are 1.02 and 1.25, respectively, and the difference is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Similarly, the mean volatility for the high score 
portfolio is lower than the mean volatility of the low score portfolio, and again the 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Similarly, in the low BM firm 
sample, the high score portfolio is significantly less risky than the low score portfolio 
Panel A1: Panel B1:
1 0.494 0.018 -0.046 1.83% 1 0.089 0.007 -0.008 0.17%
(21.09)*** (5.81)*** (-19.9)*** (5.43)*** (3.26)*** (-5.06)
2 0.488 0.019 -0.046 0.002 1.91% 2 0.086 0.008 -0.008 0.001 0.20%
(20.84)*** (6.16)*** (-20.15)*** (4.41)*** (5.26)*** (3.51)*** (-5.26) (3.07)**
Panel A2: Panel B2:
1 0.073 -0.005 -0.009 1 0.099 -0.003 -0.009 0.04%
(3.17)*** (-0.91) (-4.00)*** 0.20% (4.28)*** (-0.55) (-4.04)***
2 0.073 -0.004 -0.009 0.001 0.20% 2 0.099 -0.002 -0.009 0.000 0.10%
(3.15)*** (-0.85) (-4.02) (0.34) (4.26)*** (-0.47) (-4.07)*** (0.50)
Panel A3: Panel B3:
1 0.563 0.018 -0.052 1.66% 1 0.062 0.003 -0.006 0.17%
(11.66)*** 1.43 (-10.87)*** (1.71)* (0.55) (-1.66)*
2 0.554 0.019 -0.052 0.003 1.74% 2 0.056 0.004 -0.006 0.002 0.20%
(11.46)*** (1.66) (-10.95) (2.66)** (1.56) (0.73) (-1.73)* (2.19)**
All Firms(Raw Return)  All Firms(MAR)
 High BM Firms(Raw Return) High BM Firms(MAR)
Model Intercept BM Size F-Score R2 Model Intercept BM Size F-Score R2
Low BM Firms(Raw Return) Low BM Firms(MAR)
40 
 
in terms of market beta and volatility. Furthermore, we find that the mean beta of the 
high BM portfolio and mean beta of the low BM portfolio are virtually identical: The 
high BM portfolio has a mean beta of 1.09 and the low BM portfolio has a mean beta 
of 1.05.  
To sum up, the evidence suggests that the fact that the high score portfolio 
outperforms the low score portfolio is not a result of the high score portfolio’s high risk. 
In fact, we show that the high score portfolio has less risk than the low-score portfolio 




Relationship between the F-Score portfolio and Risk Measures 
 
Beta is calculated using weekly returns, after ensuring that at least 100 weeks of data is available. 
Volatility (Vol) is calculated using daily return, and the number represented in this table is mean one-year 
volatility. t-statistics for mean returns are from two-sample t-tests assuming unequal variance. 








β Bull β Bear β Std β Bull β Bear β Std
1 1.02     0.96      1.08       1.35% 1 0.86     0.91     0.78     1.27%
2 1.01     1.02      0.84       1.26% 2 0.95     0.96     1.07     1.26%
3 1.05     1.16      0.93       1.26% 3 1.02     1.10     0.97     1.24%
4 1.04     1.07      0.99       1.21% 4 0.96     0.95     0.88     1.14%
5 1.01     1.10      0.98       1.16% 5 0.98     1.11     0.87     1.15%
6 0.99     1.12      1.01       1.15% 6 0.91     1.02     0.76     1.08%
7 0.97     1.08      0.92       1.14% 7 0.93     1.05     0.82     1.10%
8 0.99     1.11      1.00       1.15% 8 0.93     1.02     0.85     1.12%
All 1.01 1.11 0.97 1.16% All 0.95 0.86 1.03 1.09%
High 0.98 1.09 0.95 1.14% High 0.93 1.04 0.83 1.08%
Low 1.02 1.04 0.88 1.27% Low 0.90 0.90 0.99 1.21%
High-Low -0.04 0.05 0.06 -0.14% High-Low 0.03 0.14 -0.15 -0.13%
Panel A: High BM Firms Panel B: Low BM Firms
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8.2 Portfolio Fundamentals  
 
An investor would like to know the quality of the portfolio they are holding, and for 
this study we select six common variables that are used to measure the quality of a firm. 
We choose Return on Equity (ROE), and Return on Asset (ROA), as measures of the 
level of profitability, Gross Margin (GM) and Net Profit Margin (NPM) as measures of 
earning quality, and Revenue Growth and Earnings per Share (EPS) growth as measures 
of growth ability. Both EPS growth and revenue are based on analysts’ one-year 
forecasts.  
Panel A presents statistics of the six quality variables. For both high and low BM firms, 
the high score portfolio has higher earnings, better earning quality, and faster growth 
than the low score portfolios. It is very clear that the F-Score can successfully 
differentiate the fundamentally strong firms from the fundamentally weak firms. Panel 
B shows that high score firms are cheaper than low score firms in terms of P/E ratio 
and P/B ratio. This indicates that the F-Score strategy is biased towards picking value 
stocks. Panel C shows that high and low F-score portfolios are similar in terms of 
liquidity (measured by average daily trading volume). It is worth mentioning that 
liquidity is extremely high for both high and low F-Score firms, as the average daily 
trading volume is over 150 million per stock, so liquidity is not an issue when 
implementing the F-Score strategy in China. Analyzing the average number of stocks 
in both the and high and low F-Score portfolios, we discover that the average number 
of stocks in the low F-Score portfolio for high and low BM firms is only 4 and 2 per 










Characteristic of the Piotroski’s F-Score Portfolio 
 
The table shows the mean of the sample of firms on the selected quality variable, valuation ratios, and 
the liquidity measures. Earnings per share growth and revenue growth is defined as one-year historical 
growth rate. All variables in Panel A have been winsorized at 1% and 99%. The mean price-to-earnings 
ratio is calculated as the inverse of mean earnings-yield (i.e 12 month-trailing net income before 
extraordinary item/total market capitalization). The mean price-to-book ratio is calculated as the inverse 
of mean book-yield (i.e 12 month-trailing net income before extra-ordinary item/owner’s equity). 







High Score Low Score High Score Low Score
Return on Equity 10.3% 11.6% 0.5% 16.3% 9.8%
Return on Asset 5.5% 4.5% 0.5% 11.0% 7.0%
Gross Margin 28.5% 26.4% 14.6% 36.5% 30.5%
Net Profit Margin 9.0% 18.3% 2.6% 16.0% 11.8%
Earning per Share Growth 11.6% 13.1% -28.8% 39.4% -4.4%
Revenue Growth 16.6% 20.4% 10.5% 26.1% 19.7%
Price to Earning Ratio 14.8            14.2          428.6        31.6          51.2          
Price to Book Ratio 1.9              1.3            1.7            6.7            7.3            
Average Daily Trading volume (in millions) 192.3        149.9        217.3        208.6        
Average Market Capitalization (in millions) 8,310.5      2,497.8      3,870.1      2,374.3      
Avg No. of stocks per month 31 4 15 2
High No. of stocks per month 55 11 28 8
Low No. of stocks per month 14 0 3 0
Panel C: Liquidity
Market
High BM Low BM
Panel A :Quality Variable





In this study, we replicate Piotroski’s (2000) F-Score strategy, and investigate whether 
it is possible to identify mispriced stocks in the Chinese A-Share market between 2006 
and 2014. We show that, within a high BM sample of firms, high-Score firms on 
average outperform low-Score firms. However, the t-test shows the return difference is 
not statistically significant. This means the F-Score cannot successfully differentiate 
between winners and losers in assessing firms. Unlike Piotroski (2000) we find no 
evidence of the F-Score strategy’s ability to shift the entire return distribution of high 
BM firms to the right. In fact, the 10th and 90th percentile high score firms underperform 
low score firms.  
Within our low BM firm sample, high score firms outperform low score firms by 
1.28% per month, and the result is statistically significant. However, a substantial 
portion of the return is driven by the poor performance of low F-Score firms. Admittedly, 
the strength of the strategy does not lie in picking which firms to buy, but rather which 
firms to short. The partition analysis shows the benefit of the F-Score strategy is robust 
across size, but concentrated in low liquidity firms and with firm which are reported on 
by market analysts.  
We test if the observed return is abnormal. We find that, after controlling for known 
risk factors, i.e., book-to-market, size, and market beta, the F-Score is still effective at 
explaining future returns. The F-Score strategy is also robust across time. In a low BM 
firm sample, our long-short F-Score strategy shows nine out of nine positive years. In 
addition, the high score portfolio is less risky than the low score portfolio, in terms of 
the common risk measures beta and volatility. On average, a high score portfolio has 
higher profitability, better quality of earnings, faster growth, and lower valuation. 
In this study, trading cost is not included in the back-testing of the F-Score strategy 
because the trading costs for both institutional and retail investors are extremely low. 
In 2014, the brokerage cost for retail investors was only 3 basis points(bps) for each leg 
of buy and sell, plus 10 bps of stamp duty. Institutional investors can even get brokerage 
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costs down to 1.8 bps. In addition, the turnover of the F-Score strategy is 23% per month 
for the high BM sample and 32% per month for the low BM sample. Not accounting 
for trading costs is therefore unlikely to be a major issue for the purpose of this study. 
However, the ability to short low score firms is crucial for profitability of the F-Score 
strategy in the low BM firm sample. China’s Security Regulatory Committee (CSRC) 
has very strict rules on short-selling. Usually short-selling is only allowed for large and 
liquid firms. We therefore suspect that in real world situations the profitability of the F-
Score strategy in low BM firm samples is likely to be smaller then what we document 
in this study. More detailed analysis of the impact of short selling restrictions on the 
profitability of the F-Score strategy could provide further insight on its usefulness in 
low BM firm samples. However, such analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Previous studies on the F-Score have examined its effectiveness in different 
countries, including many emerging markets. However, to our knowledge, no research 
has been undertaken on the F-Score in the Chinese A-share market. Our empirical 
results provide some useful insights into the use of the F-Score in the Chinese A-share 
market. First, we show that the F-score strategy can successfully separate winners and 
losers in the low BM firm sample, but not in the high BM firm sample. These findings 
are contrary to the commonly-held belief that the F-Score strategy works well in high 
BM firm samples. Our finding is, however, consistent with those of Rathens and 
Schelhove (2011). The F-Score works in low BM firm samples because low BM firms 
tend to underreact to bad news when this news is released. Over time, the market slowly 
incorporates the bad news into the share price, and thus a high score portfolio 
significantly outperforms a low score portfolio during non-reporting months. Evidence 
shown in this study suggests investors can use the F-Score to identify low quality 
growth firms in China. The true profitability of shorting low quality growth firms is not 
clear. However, for long-only growth fund managers, an F-Score strategy can be a 
useful tool as a filter when selecting growth stock in China.  Using the F-Score to 
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